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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
When a court of this state, acting as a court of a responding state,
finds a duty of support, it may order the defendant to furnish support
or reimbursement for support. '1
At first glance it would appear that this statute authorizes reimburse-
ment, but other parts of the Act48 and the comments of the drafting com-
mirtee49 clearly indicate that the Act is procedural only, and is not in-
tended to change the substantive law of support. Thus the above-quoted
section should be read as if it says:
In a two-state proceeding under the Act, the Ouo court can order
the defendant to pay future support and reimbursement for past support,
to the same extent that the court could do so if the action was between
Ohio residents and not under the Uniform Act.
Thus reimbursement is authorized in a Uniform Act case only if it would
be proper as alimony or in a direct suit between the parties, both of whom
are in Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court has not directly passed on the
question of whether a wife can sue her husband for reimbursement for
her own support, but such an action has been allowed in the lower courts.
In a recent case the same court of appeals stated as dictum that an aban-
doned wife may bring an action for money only against the estate of her
deceased husband for the support which he failed to furnish in his life-
time.
50
The above criticism is not meant to be captious, as the point is ren-
dered vital by a recent change in the Act. The 1955 legislature amended
the Ohio version of the Uniform Act, and in the process omitted the
above-quoted section 20.51 When this problem comes up again, the
court will be unable to ground its decision on the statute, and will have
to look to the general body of Ohio law on the substantive duty of support.
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Longo v Walter' involved a land contract which provided that the
wife of the vendor would release her dower rights. However, because
she had not signed the contract, she was not subject to a specific per-
formance action. The vendor sought to defeat a specific performance
'
7 OHIO REv. CODE § 3115.10.
IsOHIo Rav. CODE § 3115.01 (F) defines duty of support as any substantive duty
imposed or imposable under the law of Ohio.
"The comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws may be found at 9A UNIFORM LAWs ANN. 96 (1956 Supp.).
' Delaney v. Delaney, 133 N.E.2d 915, 916 (Ohio App. 1956).
" 126 Ohio Laws 560 (House Bill No. 71).
Une
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action against himself on the ground that, under the facts, he could not
have brought such action and that the remedies must be mutual. The
court, without qualification, repudiated the ancient logical fallacy of mu-
tuality of remedies saying that if the vendor "had or controlled a partial
tile, it was the option of the buyer to say whether he desired the ttde
which it was in the power of the seller to convey, with an equitable abate-
ment from the purchase price."2
In the case of In re Estat of Schoendeben a testatrix' real estate was
transferred by certificate to the devisees under her will. Later, the execu-
tor, pursuant to power granted by the will, sold the property without first
having the certificate of transfer cancelled or set aside. The existence of
the certificate was held to constitute such cloud on -the title as to warrant
the refusal of acceptance of the title by the purchaser.
In Hotze, Kuntzler & Co., v. Ersksne4 a court of appeals had under
consideration the sufficiency of a written memorandum as satisfying the
Statute of Frauds, Ohio Revised Code section 1335.05, in a specific per-
formance action. The court stated that "there can be no eformation or
change of the terms of a memorandum, for if the parties failed to
write into it what they intended, then the court can not do so."5 Carefully
read, this statement is correct. The key, supported by the facts, is that the
parties failed to say what they -intended to say. There was no allegation
of fraud, or similar wrongdoing. The court then held that the memoran-
dum did not refer -to a contract as it was stated to be a memorandum
approved by the parties "with the understanding that complete contract
will be drawn up acceptable to all concerned." Also, the description of
the subject matter was inadequate in that it gave the seller the right to
live in the present residence "with one acre of ground" as long as he
lives, without specifying the acre of ground involved.
In State v. Jaffr=n7 defendant was charged with contempt of court by
accepting one hundred dollars as payment for having a traffic ticket
"fixed." It was held that such act was an "indirect contempt," as it was
an interference with the judicial process of such a character as to bring
the court in which the traffic prosecution was pending into disrepute
by acts committed without the knowledge of the court. Consequently, the
court was without power to try such alleged contempt until written
charges had been filed and a reasonable time given to answer.
'99 Ohio App. 299, 133 N.E.2d 396 (1954)
'Id. at 301, 133 NE.2d at 398.
'99 Ohio App. 212, 132 N.E.2d 245 (1955).
'99 Ohio App. 17, 130 N.E.2d 720 (1954).
rId. at 19, 130 N.E.2d at 722.
'Id. at 20, 130 NXE.2d at 723.
'136 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio App. 1956).
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